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WEITZ CW THE COINAGE OF MAM 
by 
F.E. SP ARSHOTT 
Many are the shapes of tbe di vine 
and gods often do surprisi..ng things. 
Even what is revealed is not brought to fruition 
and a god finds a way for the unforeseen. 
Such was the outcome of this affair. 
These wise and moderate words end Euripides' Bacchae. They claim only 
that events like those in the play often happen, not that they always do, 
and not that the play has demonstrated anything aboot the nature of man. 
One who claims. as Weitz does, that King Lear and The Outsider commit 
author or reader to an .. ultimate answer" to the question what a man is 
worth, must hold either that the events portrayed in those works are pre­
sented or taken as typical. or that certain judgments uttered in them are 
presented or taken as true. I maintain that in order to sustain such a 
claim one would have to show that the judgments in question are so pre­
sented as to suggest that those who make them are wise or reliable, that 
the events portrayed are accepted as typical within their fictional world, 
and that that world itself is somehow presented as like the real world in 
the relevant respects. Yet Weitz virtually ignores such considerations. 
He calls Camus a nihilist because he takes the book's narrator to be a 
nihilist and assumes him to be meant for Everyman on no better ground 
than that we do not leam his first name .  He ascribes a reductionist view 
of man to King Lear because the good and the bad fare equally ill aod 
some of them say strikingly gloomy things while doing so- I will point to 
features of both works that suggest that the relevant events are not to be 
taken as typical. and the relevant judgments are not presented as reli­
able, so that the philosophy Weitz imputes to these works is not to be 
found in them but must be imposed on them. 
Weitz's interpretation of The Outsider is that usually accepted, and 
I am told it is authorized by retrospective comments of the author. but it 
is a.t variance with the novel as it stands. Is Meursault really an every­
man figure? First, does he strike the reader as ordinary. On the contrary, 
the very style of his narratioo is calculated to give an impression of 
oddity by its laconic detachment, the disorientation that comes from the 
frequent omission of expected indications of elapsed time , the abruptness 
that comes from the lack of expected grammatical connectives, and otl1er 
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features. To prevent us from taking this as mere inarticulate tacitumity, 
the narrative is larded wiLh passages of elabor.ite rhetmic. Next, do his 
companions accept him as ordinat'y? WeiLz's assertion that '"he is normal 
enough to his friends"'  ignores the many occasions on which Meursault 
relates how people look at him with surprise , or greet. his remarks with 
silence. This response is not confined to the legal grotesques of Part n, 
but is shared by his companions in Part t .1 Does he even accept himself 
as ordinary? If he does, l don't see why he tells us that he used to have 
the sort of ambition his boss expects of him, ·'But, when I had to drop 
my studies, 1 very soon realized all that was pretty futile " :  in other 
words, that his alienation is not intrinsic to him but stems rrnm dis­
appointment. 
Ordinary or not , is Meursault's shooting of the Arab characteristic of 
him? Not. according to his account. As in the other crucial episodes, his 
mother's funeral, his interrogation, and his trial, we hear of his feeling 
of oppression and intolerable heat. The murder is presented as though it 
were an attempt to escape from the rays of the sun. When asked to ex­
plain his crime. he does not reject this request as silly but tries to ex­
plain that it was · "b�c:ause of the sun" although be knows this sounds 
ridiculous. Weitz emphasizes Meursault's remark. "J'ai pens� � ce 
moment qu'on pouvait tirer oo ne pas tirer et que tout ce� se valait". 
But it is not when he shoots the Arab that he says that: it is when he 
has been to some trouble to get the gun away from Raymond to prevent 
him from shooting. That the actual murder is not to be thus explained is 
clearly shown by the extraordinary description or that event itself. Camus 
is at pains to hint a t  a psychopathic aetiology both for Meursauu· s alien­
ation and for his rrime. But Weitz, like most critics, ignores these hints 
in the interests of a pmtentous Sartrian metaphysic. 
Let us suppose , in defiance of the book, that Camus is either es­
pousing his narrator's viewpoint or inviting the reader to do so. Even so, 
the implied viewpoint is not that alleged by Weitz. What the book sug­
gests to Weitz is that morality is an arbitrarily imposed convention. 
unjustifiable by nature; that the murder was an action hke any other. and 
that it makes no real difference what one does. Meursault in his honesty 
sees through the shams and hypocrisies of the respectable bourgeois and 
stands for that absurd consciousness whose existence precedes essence. 
But the Meursault l find written into the book is an ' outsider' not because 
he lacks the social hypocrisies of other men but because he cannot enter 
into vital relations with them. When Marie asks him if he loves her he 
takes this, insa.nely, as a request for information about his feelings, not 
as a plea for an avowal. His agreement to marry her he grotesquely t.akes 
not as a commitment but as a prediction. When Salamano asks him if he 
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thinks the police will have his lost dog destroyed, the book leaves no 
doubt that this is a pathetic plea for reassurance, but Meursault again 
takes it as no more than a request for information about police practice. 
Meursault does not reject social conventions as such: on the contrary, he 
is very definite about the conditions in which one is justified in joining 
a fight or pulling a gun on a man armed with a knife. To stress this point, 
Camus provided Meursault wit.h immediate neighbors who are involved 
with those closest to them, Raymond with his girl and Salamano with his 
dog, not in conventional moral relationships but in intense and des true t­
ive ones. Personal involvement, not hypocritical compliance, is what 
Meursault lacks. Then, in Part n. the situation is reversed: Meursault in 
prison comes to feel that he is a man like others (' ' r' ta.is comme eux·' 
he says twice) and in need of human sympathy. But he cannot recognize 
it when it is offered. He cannot see the significance of Marie 's brave, re­
assuring smile. The dialectic of sympathy demanded and orf ered or denied 
is the whole fabric of the book. It cannot be cancelled by the final pages 
in which. conscious at last of the "dark wind from the future " which is 
his impending death, he finds his happiness in the tender indifference of 
the world, and hopes only for a cursing mob to diminish his solitude. 
Even in those pages there is an ambiguity. When he finally says that 
· ·nothing was important'·. does he mean that nothing was ever important 
or only that nothing is so to a man on the �ve of his execution? When he 
says that the dark wind was approaching . . pendant toute cette vie absurde 
que j 'avais men€e ," does he mean that all lives are absurd . or only what 
he says. that the estranged life he was living in Part I was absurd? Only 
a prior belief that the book must be preaching vulgar existentialism would 
lead us to pref er the former alternative in either case; tbe book Camus 
wrote nudges us toward the latter. 
Now let us turn to King Lear. Weitz finds the play "baffling" in its 
thematic complexity. but I do not see why a play should be expected to 
have a single theme . The unity of Lear rests sufficiently on the unity of 
its action, which is quite linear in its progression from Lear's renunci­
ation of power and the disruption of his kingdom to the restoration of the 
kindgom and the completion of his own destmct1on. In what sense is this 
action to be taken as lypical? Tragedies are moving because their action 
is extraordinary and terrible. Everyone in this play is continually stress­
ing the exceptionalness of Lear's misfortunes. the extravagance of his 
daughter's unnatural conduct, the unexampled fury of the storms, and so 
on. Rather than taking all this as exemplifying the normal course of 
events we might rather take it as showing lhat on Lear's abdication of 
his divinely ordained position all hell has hroken loose. The natural 
order is not restored until the end of the play when Albany invites Kent 
to sustain · · the gored state · ' .  
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Weitz builds his brilliant and moving interpretation of U1e play a­
rowld the speech ln which Lear, caught in the storm, says of the dis­
guised Edgar that · · U naccornrnodateel man is no more but such a poor, 
bare. forked animal as thou art." But is an audience to take that as 
Shakespeare's conclusion? Hardly. Lear. we know, is undergoing severe 
and prolonged mental stress; he is, we observe • .actually going mad; he 
suffers at the moment from great physical discomfort. More important, the 
audience knows that the man to whom this is addressed is not what he 
seems to be, but is simulating pove1ty and helplessness. We have j\.lst 
heard Edgar describe his own disguise as · · the basest and most poorest 
shape/ that ever penury in contempt of man/ brought near to beast." 
This pronouncement of the sane and prudent Edgar emphasizes that man 
is not beast. It is perverse to take his pretended condition as natural or 
typical of how things reaJly are. 
I agree with Weitz that kingship in this play may be taken as a meta­
phor for humanity. But kingship is sustained throughout. As soon as Lear 
stops claiming it for himself by saying things like · 'every inch a king' ' .  
and -claims only humanity, others sta.rt insisting o n  bis kingship for him: 
"No� sir, you must not kneel" . . . "ln your own kingdom. sir " • . .  "WiJl't 
please your highness walk?" Lear's royalty is inalienable, just as Edgar 
is no brute but a prudent man.2 If all that Weitz means when oo says that 
" Man's unaccommodated virtues have no secure basis· in brute nature" is 
that men may undergo misfortune and be shattered by it. this is no more 
than everyone knows; but t.o recognize the wheel of fortwle is not t.o deny' 
the chain of being. Certainly Lear is not ague-proof. but if there is no 
real order in the world what is happening on the stage is not really 
terrible. 
Weitz 's reading of the play requires that Lear>s demand for tot.al sub­
mission from Cordelia should be "metaphysically ..  justified, being "con­
sistent with his absolute commitment to royal kingship and human father­
hood in a value-structured universe .•'  But in terms of that · 'value-struc­
tured universe" Lear's unconditional demand. like his abdication of his 
royal responsibilities, is a monstrosity. Cordelia is right to answer · 'I 
love your majesty/according to my bond; nor more, nor less " ;  she will 
indeed owe a duty to " that lord whose hand must take " her " plight." 
What Cordelia says is just what Desdemona says to Brabantio in a. play 
of the same vintage: 
My noble father. 
I do perceive here a divided duty: 
To you I am bound for life and education; 
My life and education both do learn me 
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How to respect you; you are fhe lord of duty. -
I am hitherto your daughter: but here's my husband : 
And so much duty as my mother showed 
To you, pref erring you before her father. 
So much I challenge that I may profess 
Due to the Moor my lord. 
Unlike Lear, Brabantio gives way when thus challenged. Lear's uncon­
ditional demand is a violation of that natural order in which husbands as 
well as parents have their proper place. Goneril's and Regan's acquies­
cence shows not that they accept the natural order but that they will say 
whatever is to their advantage at the moment: it is not surprising that 
their later actions belie their words. I cannot read the play as making 
values rest on what Weitz calls "man's royal proclamation and commit­
ment, with no metaphysical justification." Lear in his extremity re­
nounces all demands, but bis humility does not blind him to the natural 
order. He can still say "Your sisters/have , as I do remembe r. done me 
wrong"; and the reason wny a voice "soft, gentle and low" is "an ex­
cellent thing in woman ' ·  i s  not merely aesthetic, but because the natural 
inferiority of women requires modesty. Nothing in the play undermines the 
the view implied by the ' 'Gentleman' ·  in IV. vi who says: " Thou hast one 
daughter/who redeems nature from the general curse/which twain have 
brought her to. ' • 
At the root of Weitz's interpretation lies a metaphysical mistake. He 
equates the "brute nature·� in which man's virtues have no place with the 
scala naturae, the entire natural order. But to call nature "brute " is 
to exclude human nature from it by definition , and of course human vir­
tues are not to be found in that part of nature which is defined by their 
exclusion. It is hardly surprising that Weitz seems uncertain what the 
rretaphysical justification of virtue could be and how it would justify. 
Sometimes, as. in the contrast between sophisticated and unaccommodated 
man. he seems to suggest that virtue would be justified if it were im­
planted b!' inst1nct. and hence not hypocritical; sometime s .  that it would 
be justified if any infraction of law were visited by immediate divine 
retribution, so that the universe would not be indifferent; sometimes. that 
it would be justified if analogues for it could be found among the lower 
animals. or " brute nature ' · .  But none of these justifications would work. 
Instincts would necessitate moral behavior. not justify it. Animal ana­
logues might somehow ca\lsally explain morality or excuse immorality. 
but there seems no rational ground for the demand that animals of one 
species shoulct model their behavior oo that of any other species. And lf 
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offences were punished by immediate fire from heaven morality would be 
reduced to the stat.us of self ·preservation.3 Yet Weitz seems to think that 
because justifications of these preposterous kinds are impossible, 
· ·Human values cannot be reasoned and justified at all" and '"H umanity 
itself. • .  is man's royal proclamation and commitment." In saving this 
te implies that what he calls "the absolute requirement of value for man 
and society" is not a rational justification at all. But why does it fail to 
be a complete, and completely rational. justification of human values that 
without them human life is impossible? And in what sense does this fail 
to be a metaphys ical justification? The normal life of men is that which 
they ordinarily live and in which their potentialitie s can be realized; and 
this is a social life in which men commit themselves to each other and to 
a common order. This norm is implied as natural by The Outsider no less 
clearly than by l<ing Lear. So long as Meursault is not removed from 
human society, in solitary confinement awaiting imminent execution. he 
must regard his four gratuitous shots, as he says he does. as four knocks 
on the door of misery. And you and I are not, nor doos Camus imply that 
we are, in solitary confinement a waiting imminent eKecution. 4 When Lea1· 
simultaneously renounces the duties of monarchy, exaggerates the claims 
of paternity. and loses the virtue of clemency, his actions lead naturally to 
disaster, for himself and others. In so far as man does create man, he 
does not do so gratuitously or in a social vacuum. Even for Sartre , man is 
free only to make a situation out of the factual surroundings in which he 
finds himself. and his freedom is only to commit himself to some project 
in a world of men each of whom has tile same freedom. Lear and Meur· 
sault are presented as extraordinary people bringing misfortune 011 them· 
selves and Cll others. and they do so because they fail to recognize the 
reality of other people's lives and to accept the responsibilities that 
such recognition imposes. If King Lear and The Outsider show anything, 
that is what they show. 
1 Meursault•s d ifference from his companions also appears in the episode where Raymond 
beats h i s  girl. After witnessing this incident, "Marie and I finished getting our lunch 
ready. B"t she hadn't an')' appetite. and I ate nea,.ly a l l . ' · 
2 I cannot accept Weitz's reading of ' 'They cannot touch me for coining: I am the king 
himself." In this scene the king is raising a band of imaginary retainers to replace the 
ones he lost - compare the conscription scene in Henry IV f>ar( II, I l l . i i .  He is paying 
them 1n imaginary coin and assuring them that ir is good money. He cannot be touched 
(i.e. arrested or punished) for c;oining (i.e. uttering false coin) because as the king h e  
has the sole right to issue coin a n d  whatever he mints is IPSO facto true coin. 
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Poet•c Ju1ttic• Oft a lon1er rane-e s-111s to be prese•ved. Thou1h Glost•r •ays of him:;•lf 
(IV .I.), "As flies to wanton boys are we to the iods,/they kill us for their sport," the 
elear-s1&hted Ediar says (V.lii) "The &ods are iu•t. and of our plea$ant vices/make 
instruments to plaiue us./The dark and vicious place where thee he i.ot/eost him his 
eyes.'' And Edmund replies: • 'Thou hast spoken ri&ht, 'tis true;/The wheel has come 
fut I circle, I am here." We recall that the play beaan with Glosoer s.-yln& of Edmund. 
"There was iood sport at his ma kin& ... 
Of course, solitary confinement Is often used as a metaphor for the fact that to be eon• 
selous Is to be conscious as one person only. and execution as a met.aphor for the in­
evltable fate of death, But in sober truth the ways in which people are not mutual ly 
Isolated are 11$ Important as the ways 1n which they are, and the fact that we a1e bound 
to die at last does not abolish the difference between those who have e reasonable 
chance of dolno& a lot of things first and those who have no such expectation. 
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